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Abstract  
The unemployment compensation system is at the centre of the current 
economic and political debate in many Western countries which, under the effects 
of the increase in public debt, must decide the level of their unemployment 
insurance while taking into account its impact on the performance of the labour 
market. In this article, we compare the generosity of such public policy in France 
and in Canada, while focusing on the experience of central and eastern Europe. 
By building a composite index, we show that the French unemployment insurance 
is more generous only in pecuniary terms, and not in its qualitative dimension.  
 
Keywords: unemployment insurance, generosity, pecuniary 
1. Introduction 
Unemployment compensation is a public policy which is current the subject 
of several reforms and debates in Western countries in economic crisis. For 
example, in France unemployment insurance is generally considered more 
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generous than its Canadian equivalent, employment-insurance (EI).1 This finding 
can be explained by the fundamental ideological differences between the two 
labour markets. Canada is a "flexible" market, where programs of income 
guarantees and social minimums are not generous, and wherein the rules relating 
to employment protection are less stringent. This Canadian approach claims to 
promote labour market participation and to reduce inequalities in access to 
employment.  
On the contrary, France is characterized by the "rigidity" of its public 
policies in terms of employment protection and wage regulation, including  
a minimum wage level which is still relatively high compared to other OECD 
countries. While this rigidity is responsible for an accentuation of unemployment, 
it has contributed significantly to reducing income inequality (Cahuc and 
Zylberberg 2004; Holmlund 2006). 
This being said, the continuing global economic crisis globally has imposed 
some international convergence in the approaches and policies of the labour 
market. In this sense, Amine (2011) explains that the various unemployment-
insurance programs in the OECD, following some recent changes, are becoming 
increasingly similar. Indeed, the contrast between the characteristics of the Anglo-
Saxon and European models is fading. This therefore leads us to question the 
validity of assumptions and suppositions that France more generously supports its 
unemployed than Canada. Specifically, we ask the following question: Is the 
French unemployment insurance system is really more generous than its Canadian 
equivalent, the EI? This question is particularly relevant given the current socio-
economic context in the two countries.  
The main purpose of this article is to compare the generosity of the French 
and Canadian EI systems by using OECD data and building a composite index. 
We first present a brief review of the literature to identify various existing 
methods of comparison. In the second section, we specify the parameters of our 
approach. Finally, we present the results of our comparison.  
2. Literature Review 
The most common method for assessing the generosity of EI is the net 
replacement rate (TRN). Popularized by the OECD since the 1990s, the TRN 
refers to the ratio of received non-employment income (EI) and income 
employment. In order to study other qualitative dimensions of the generosity of 
                                                 
1
 We use the term employment-insurance (EI) indiscriminately to designate the Canadian and the 
French systems. EI thus refers to the concept, i.e. the object of study, and not to a specific program. 
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German EI, Schulze (2005) explains that EI systems consist essentially of three 
components: the replacement rate, the admission conditions, and the eligibility 
rules that define the obligations of eligible workers.  
Note that other types of indicators include the budget as a proportion of 
gross domestic product (GDP) allocated to the EI program. However, as noted by 
Scruggs (2006), using expenditure alone can lead to making false conclusions, 
since the index is not sensitive to changes in production GDP. 
In the same vein, Venn (2012) extended the measure of generosity by 
carefully operationalizing the more qualitative dimension of EI systems using an 
evaluation grid, from which he constructs a composite index. Specifically, the 
qualitative dimension is divided into four components (eligibility conditions, 
availability requirements and job research, monitoring or control, and sanctions). 
Using this method, Venn (2012) performed an international (not pecuniary) 
comparison of the qualitative generosity of EI systems. The results were 
surprising. Canada was ahead of France in terms of generosity and ranks among 
the least severe in the OECD countries. We must note, however, the fact that the 
composite index of Venn (2012) excludes employee benefit levels and duration. 
Stovicek and Turrini (2012) studied the theoretical generosity of each 
country, in others words, the level of generosity that the system of each country 
should have taking into consideration the characteristics of their economies. The 
theoretical or potential generosity of each country is essentially derived from 
real GDP per capita and compared with the real generosity. 
In the same spirit, Pallage et. al. (2009) used a general equilibrium model to 
compare the characteristics of EI systems in two different economies. However, the 
parameters of EI systems included in the design of their model are relatively basic.  
Concerning other economies, for example Bulgaria’s, Vodopivec et.al. 
(2005) explained that an individual can continue to claim unreduced benefits so 
long as earnings do not exceed 150 percent of the official minimum wage. By 
comparison, the maximum admissible level of earnings is 100 percent of the 
minimum wage in Hungary, and 50 percent in both Poland and Romania. 
Moreover, in Slovenia the replacement rate is 70 percent in the first three months, 
followed by 60 percent in the remaining months. A notable exception is Poland, 
where the benefit level is not related to previous earnings but rather set at 36 
percent of the national average wage. In Estonia, until 2003 a flat fee benefit was 
also in place, set at a very low level (below 10 percent of the average wage). Some 
countries, such as Bulgaria and the Czech Republic, reward those who attend or 
complete training courses by offering them a higher replacement rate. 
In another study in the same countries, Polakowski and Szelewa (2008) 
explored the unemployment compensation policies in the eight Central and Eastern 
Europe countries which joined the European Union in 2004. Their paper applies an 
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innovative comparative method and focuses on the following four dimensions: 
accessibility, generosity, duration of receiving benefits, and obligations of claimants.  
They demonstrated that insofar as the generosity dimension was concerned, it 
varied quite significantly across cases and over time. They added that some patterns 
could however be observed. Some countries guaranteed generous benefits at the 
beginning of the analyzed period, only to reduce them later (and in some cases to 
later raise their level again). Others started with modest benefits which increased 
over time. The most generous country, Hungary, except for 1989 maintained very 
generous unemployment compensation over the analyzed period. Even though some 
reforms were introduced, the level of benefits was exceptionally high for this group 
of countries. Hungary contrasted starkly with the case of Poland, which provided 
quite high levels of benefits only in the beginning, subsequently reducing them to 
a significant extent. In Poland the flat-rate benefit was introduced already at the 
beginning of the 1990s, and established at the level of 36% of the average wage. 
In the second half of the 1990s, however, the benefit was paid in a fixed amount, 
which further decreased its generosity. With respect to the Czech and Slovak 
Republics, they pursued rather similar policies in terms of their generosity. Both 
countries started with a high level of benefits, reducing them in steps. The most 
important change in the Slovak system was the introduction of a replacement rate 
decreasing over time (50% for the first, and 40% for the second phase). These 
actions took place faster and to a greater extent in the Czech Republic - the change 
in Slovakia, reflected by the score results, was reversed in 2004. 
The Baltic countries diverged significantly in terms of the generosity of their 
unemployment compensation policies. Estonia started from a quite high level, than 
reduced its generosity dramatically, then restored a modest level from 2002. In the 
mid-1990s this country had the lowest replacement rate in the region (about 7% in 
1997). Its better results in 2002 and 2004 were the result of introducing an earnings-
related system. In Latvia, this swing occurred faster and for a shorter time, and 
eventually a higher level of benefits was restored. Initially, the level of benefits in 
Latvia depended on the minimum wage (90%), but in the mid-1990s an earnings-
related system was enacted, which set the replacement rates at two levels, which 
decreased over time (80% and 60%). This system was also reformed recently, and 
the rates were decreased to 75% and 50% respectively. Lithuania took a different 
path: the level of benefits was initially consistently rising and reached a high level 
generosity, and then from the second half 1990s onward it dropped significantly. In 
other words, at the beginning of the 1990s this country, had an earnings-related 
system with three phases of payments (70%, 60% and 50%), and afterwards it 
introduced more complicated system and a ceiling that significantly reduced 
generosity. Slovenia demonstrates an interesting pattern. The level of benefits was 
rather high at the beginning, and then it grew even higher. 
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In the same vein, Bardasi et. al. (1999) investigated why the targeting of 
benefits clearly worsened throughout the 1990s in Hungary. They showed that both 
the proportion of OECD unemployed with unemployment benefits, and the 
proportion of those with benefits who searched for work, fell in Hungary by some 
15 percent points over 1993 to 1997.  
Finally, Boeri and Edwards (1998) showed that non-employment rates in 
all central and eastern European countries, except the Czech Republic, had 
already bypassed those of the lowest income OECD countries.  
3. The Concept of a Composite Index  
In order to assess the quantitative aspect of EI systems, we use the net 
replacement rate (TRN), provided and calculated by the Tax-Benefit Model of 
the OECD (2013). Since the replacement level may vary depending on family 
status (single or married, with or without children), we also incorporate these 
demographic differences into our analysis. Furthermore, whereas previous 
income largely determines the importance of profits during the period of 
unemployment, we compare the financial generosity of the French and Canadian 
systems at three levels of income, 67%, 100% and 150% of median income. 
It is important to note that the rates calculated by the OECD consider not 
only unemployment benefits but also family benefits. Family benefits are added 
to income offered by the EI, which explains the variation in replacement rates 
between different types of families. Since the net replacement rate is not 
sufficient to measure the monetary dimension of an EI system, we add an 
additional indicator reflecting another component of the quantitative generosity 
of systems, namely the duration of benefits. Specifically, on a scale of 1–5 we 
evaluate the maximum duration of benefits as provided by the current legislation 
in Canada and in France. A score of 1 is given to the least generous length (less 
than 6 months) and 5 to the most generous length (more than 24 months). 
To measure the qualitative dimension of the two systems, we rely on the 
excellent assessment grid proposed by Venn (2012). Indeed, we combine the four 
components of non-pecuniary dimensions of EI system: conditions of eligibility, 
availability requirements and job research, monitoring and control, as well as 
sanctions. Each component is then evaluated based on one or more items 
measured on a scale of graduated severity [1-5], where 1 is the most severe 
situation and 5 reflects the most generous case (Table 1). 
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Finally it remains to weigh the various indicators in a grid summary 
evaluation in order to develop our composite index. In sum, we have a total of six 
assessed components, using 11 indicators that we want to incorporate into  
a summary index with a value between 0–1, i.e. a total of 11 indicators. Equal 
importance was given to the pecuniary and non-pecuniary dimensions. Similarly, 
we assign the components within each dimension equal weight. 
Table 1: Weighing of the indicators 






 Replacement of 
income 1. Net replacement rate  1/4 
Duration of benefits 2. Maximum duration of benefits  1/4 
 
 













3. Employment Period or minimum 
contribution   1/16 
4. Penalties for voluntary non-
employment   1/16 
Availability 
requirements and job 
search 
5. Availability during participation in  
a PAMT   1/32 
6. Requirements for occupational 
mobility   1/32 
7. Requirements for geographic 
mobility   1/32 
8. Other valid reasons for refusing job 
offers   1/32 
Monitoring and 
control 9. Evidence of a job search  1/8 
Sanctions 
10. Sanctions for refusing a job offer or 
participation in a PAMT   1/16 
11. Sanctions for refusing repeated 
offers of employment or participation in 
a PAMT 
  1/16 
Subtotal   1/2 
Total  1   
Source: The table is based on Venn (2012), but we have developed our own grid by changing the 
weight and the score of each indicator.  
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4. Results  
In this section, we present the results of the comparison of two EI systems. 
Quantitative generosity  
Fig. 1 shows the combined generosity of indicators 1 and 2, i.e. the net 
replacement rate (TRN) and the maximum duration of benefits. Regarding the 
net replacement rate, we chose two types of family and three income levels 
(67%, 100% and 150% of average income). The first type – A, is that of a single 
person without children, while the second type – B, refers to a married couple 
with two earners and two children.  














Family type and income level
Canada TRN Canada maximum duration
 
Source: The information and data needed to evaluate the indicators came mainly from the online resources 
of the following institutions: OECD, Service Canada and Employment and Social Development 
Canada, and the French Ministry of Labour, Employment Training and Social Dialogue. 
In a paper which examines this aspect, Corsini (2012) studies the 
determinants of the duration of unemployment. In particular, he takes a comparative 
approach, analyzing three different countries (Italy, Finland, and Poland). In his 
article Poland is chosen as an example of a former transition economy that is still 
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facing some economic problems, unemployment being probably the most relevant. 
Its EI scheme is not particularly generous; it offers only minor employment 
services; and it does not have any job search requirements. In addition, Corsini 
explains that the Polish EI scheme grants benefits to registered unemployed 
individuals who are able and ready to take up employment. Contribution to the 
scheme is compulsory and workers are entitled to receive the benefits if, during the 
period of 18 months preceding the day of registration as unemployed, they have 
been employed for at least 365 days and if the end of the contract was not voluntary. 
The benefit amounts to 24% of the average national wage, about 151 hours per 
month in 2007, but it is adjusted according to the length of past employment spells 
so that more experienced workers receive higher benefits. The maximum duration 
is 6 months, but it can be increased to 12 or 18 months for individuals from areas 
where the unemployment rate is higher than the national average. The overall 
ranking in generosity of the Polish scheme, among the OECD countries, is 21st 
out of 29. The data used are from the EU-SILC 2008 survey, which contains 
detailed data on individuals and households in 2007. It is based on a sample of 
195 newly unemployed workers for Finland, 536 for Italy, and 471 for Poland. An 
econometric analysis of unemployment duration is conducted, with a focus on the 
effect that unemployment benefits, wealth and financial pressure have on duration, 
using a cox hazard model. 
Qualitative generosity 
Admission conditions. In Canada, the period of employment or minimum 
contribution (indicator 3) is calculated in hours over a period of 12 months and 
varies depending on the unemployment rate in the region where the benefit 
claimant resides. The longest minimum period is 700 hours in a region where the 
unemployment rate is less than 6% and the period of the shortest contribution is 
420 hours for a region with an unemployment rate of 13.1 % and more. In France, 
the period of minimum contribution is 122 days or 610 hours of work in the last 
28 months. 
With respect to penalties for voluntary unemployment (indicator 4), such  
a situation applies to all applicants who have access to EI benefits in Canada. In 
France, voluntary unemployment delays access to unemployment compensation 
for a period of 12 weeks, after which the applicant can receive benefits if he is 
able to prove that he actively sought employment during this period.  
Availability requirements and job search. In France, an individual 
participating in an active labour market policy (indicator 5), i.e. training, must 
register as a job seeker in order to remain eligible for unemployment benefits. 
The obligations of job seekers are that the individual consistently demonstrates 
positive acts of carrying out a job search and accepts any reasonable job offer 
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throughout his training. In Canada, the unemployed in training programs approved 
by the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Development Canada (HRSDC), 
do not have obligation to seek and accept jobs. However, the unemployed who, on 
their own initiative, participate in training unrecognized by HRSDC must seek 
continuous employment and accept any reasonable offer in order to receive 
regular benefits. 
In Canada, the requirements for occupational mobility (indicator 6) allow 
the unemployed to refuse, for a period of 18 weeks, a job that does not correspond 
to the same occupation as that exercised during the qualification period. After this 
period, the unemployed must find a similar job, in other words, an occupation 
with comparable functions. In addition, the requirements of professional mobility 
in France are determined by the personalized access to employment (PPAE) 
project, which defines, jointly by the job seeker and employment advisor, proper 
cluster training, qualifications, and skills gained in the unemployed’s professional 
experience. A job seeker who cannot find a reasonable job, however, must agree 
to expand the scope of his or her job search by redefining its (PPAE) every three 
months.  
Requirements of geographical mobility (indicator 7) also vary between 
the two systems. In Canada, employment insurance recipients must accept any 
job whose commuting time is less than two hours. For their part, the French 
unemployed must accept any reasonable job offer in which the travel time is less 
than one hour per day or less than 30 km from their home. 
In France, registered job seekers may refuse a job for family reasons and 
physical health (indicator 8). An offer may also be refused if the wage offered is 
below the salary received during the reference period. However, as is the case in 
Canada, the wage considered suitable decreases with time spent in unemployment 
from 100 % (within three months of registration) and 95% (between 3 and  
6 months) to 85% (between 6 months and one year). After a year, the claimant must 
accept any offer with a wage equal to or greater than the benefits received.  
Monitoring and Control. Canadian recipients must at all times be ready 
and willing to work if they are able to find a suitable job. They must keep  
a detailed job search activities register, as Service-Canada may request evidence at 
any time. However, there is no systematic control as is the case in France where 
unemployment insurance recipients must provide monthly updates to a counselor 
job center, and register and submit evidence of an active job search by keeping  
a record of all the positive and repeated acts of searching for employment made 
during the period preceding the meeting.  
Sanctions. In Canada, and employment insurance claimant is disqualified 
from receiving benefits for a period of 7 to 12 weeks if he or she does not apply 
for an offer of a suitable job after learning that there is a vacancy for such a job. 
142                                                                     Samir Amine                                                            
 
Also excluded is an individual who does not accept an offer of suitable job, who 
does not take advantage of an opportunity to obtain a suitable job, who does not 
appear for an interview which the Insurance Commission-Canada Employment 
ordered him or her to attend, or who does not follow written instructions given by 
the Commission regarding the job search. For the recipients of unemployment 
benefits in France, there is no penalty for refusing an initial suitable job offer, but 
after the second refusal a two month suspension is imposed. Repeated refusals 
may lead to a suspension of benefits from two to six months.  
Total generosity  
Figure 2 illustrates the relative importance of each component in assessing 
the generosity of an EI system. We calculated the average scores of indicators for 
each component in order to construct this summary figure. However, with regard 
to the net replacement rate, we simply used the replacement net income measured 
from a reference wage of 100% of the average wage for a family of type B. We 
also used the weighting Table 1 and the 0–1 scale of generosity.  
Figure 2. Total generosity and relative importance of each component (TRN 100% SM, 
Family and Type B before weighting) 
Source: The information and data needed to evaluate the indicators came mainly from the online resources 
of the following institutions: OECD, Service Canada and Employment and Social Development 
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Figure 2 allows us to identify the most important differences in terms of 
generosity between the Canadian and French systems. At the outset, we see that the 
"benefit period" (indicator 2) and "monitoring and control" (indicator 9) represents 
the levels with the most significant differences. Indeed, we have seen that the 
maximum duration of benefits in France is more than twice that of Canada.  
In general, the French system offers more generous financial terms 
(quantitative generosity) at both the replacement rate and at the level of the benefit 
period. This result is consistent with the direction and orientation that characterize 
French public policy, which considers that the standard of living of jobseekers 
should be maintained and that the unemployment situation should not lead to  
a deterioration of living conditions and an increase in social exclusion. On the other 
hand the Canadian system, like all flexible economies, considers unemployment as  
a situation whose consequences should be borne largely by the individual and not by 
the firm. However, Figure 2 also shows the dilemma facing those countries known 
as "rigid". Indeed, these countries, under the impact of a significantly significant 
public debt, are obliged to be very strict about the rules for monitoring, control and 
applying sanctions. On this level (qualitative generosity), France is less generous 
than Canada. When we observe the reforms and the budgetary restrictions adopted 
by the French government to absorb the budget deficit, we easily understand the 
severity and rigidity of the control rules and penalties.  
5. Concluding Remarks  
From the replacement rate through to the sanctions, our approach has the 
benefit of combining pecuniary and non-pecuniary components. This advantage is 
rarely seen in the proposed methods in the literature. However, our approach is not 
without bias, related to the consideration of qualitative parameters. In other words, 
some of the selected indicators often reflect the theoretical generosity that is 
provided for in the law, and not necessarily reflected in the benefits actually 
received by the beneficiaries. For example, we assign to Indicator 2 a score based 
on the maximum duration provided by each system. However, it is clear that the 
average duration of benefits is less than the maximum provided in the law. 
We have qualified the idea that French jobseekers benefit from an 
absolute generosity compared to their Canadian counterparts. As we explained 
in a previous paragraph, this only applies to generosity at the pecuniary level. As 
for the qualitative dimensions of the unemployment compensation system, 
Canada is more flexible in terms of rules governing sanctions, monitoring and 
control. We believe that this greater strictness on the part of the French is 
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attributable to the heavy national debt in France, where the government has 
launched a process of restrictive budgetary reforms. 
However, although Canada could learn from European experiences from 
countries such as France and Poland, it is important to note that we are witnessing  
a convergence of public policies in terms of the labour market in all OECD 
countries. 
Forced to combine budget and competitive imperatives, most of these 
countries have engaged in a process to reduce labour costs and to make the return 
to employment faster. We believe that the deterioration of the economic and social 
situation of the unemployed will grow wider and deeper in all countries, especially 
the European countries. 
References  
Amine S. (2011), Les instituions du marché du travail et les inégalités inter-catégorielles, ʻRevue 
multidisciplinaire sur l’emploi, le syndicalisme et le travailʼ, 6, 5–19. 
Bardasi E., Lasaosa A., Micklewright J. and Nagy G. (1999), Measuring the Generosity of 
Unemployment Benefit Systems: Evidence from Hungary and elsewhere in Central Europe, Institute 
of Economics, Centre for Economic and Regional Studies, Working Papers 9908. 
Boeri T., Edwards S. (1998), Long-term unemployment and short-term unemployment benefits: The 
changing nature of non-employment subsidies in Central and Eastern Europe, ʻEmpirical Economics ,ʼ 23, 
31–54. 
Cahuc P. and Zylbergberg A. (2004), Labour Economics, The Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Press, Cambridge.  
Corsini L. (2012), Unemployment Insurance Schemes, Liquidity Constraints and Re-employment:  
a three Country Comparison, ʻomparative Economic Studiesʼ, 54, 321–340. 
Fredriksson P., Holmlund B. (2006), Improving Incentives in Unemployment Insurance: A Review 
of Recent Research, ʻJournal of Economic Surveysʼ, 20, 357-386.  
OECD. (2013), Methodology, Publications OCDE, Paris. 
Pallage S., Scruggs L. and Zimmermann C. (2009), Measuring Unemployment Insurance Generosity, 
Economics Working Papers 200842. 
Polakowski M., Szelewa D. (2008), Evolution of unemployment compensation in Central and 
Eastern Europe balancing rights and activation of unemployed, Department of Political and 
Social Sciences, European University Institute.  
Schulze S. (2005), An Index of Generosity for the German UI-System, University of the Federal 
Armed Forces Hamburg, Department of Economics, Discussion Paper, No. 42. 
                                             The Canadian Unemployment–Insurance…                                     145 
 
Scruggs L. (2006), The generosity of social insurance, ʻOxford Review of Economic Policyʼ, 22, 
349–364. 
Stovicek K. and Turrini A. (2012), Benchmarking Unemployment Benefits Systems, European 
Commission, ʻEconomic Papersʼ, No. 454. 
Venn D. (2012), Eligibility Criteria for Unemployment Benefits: Quantitative Indicators for 
OECD and EU Countries, OECD Social, Employment and Migration Working Papers, No. 131. 
Vodopivec M., Worgotter A. and Raju D. (2005), Unemployment Benefit Systems in Central and 





HOJNOŚĆ KANADYJSKIEGO SYSTEMU UBEZPIECZEŃ NA 
WYPADEK BEZROBOCIA: WNIOSKI Z ANALIZY PORÓWNAWCZEJ  
 
System kompensacji bezrobocia znajduje się w centrum bieżącej debaty 
ekonomicznej i politycznej w większości krajów zachodnich. Wzrost długu publicznego 
zmusza te państwa do podjęcia decyzji politycznych dotyczących poziomu ubezpieczeń 
na wypadek bezrobocia, przy jednoczesnym uwzględnieniu jego wpływu na sytuację na 
rynku pracy. W tym artykule porównujemy hojność polityki państwa w tym zakresie we 
Francji i w Kanadzie, jednocześnie skupiając się na doświadczeniach Europy Środkowej  
i Wschodniej. Konstruując wskaźnik złożony pokazujemy, że francuski system ubezpieczenia 
na wypadek bezrobocia jest bardziej hojny tylko w ujęciu finansowym, ale nie w wymiarze 
jakościowym.  
Słowa kluczowe: ubezpieczenie na wypadek bezrobocia, hojność, wymiar finansowy 
 
